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This circular reasoning should not be the basis for denying constitu-
tional rights. The equal protection clause under the United States Consti-
tution demands that foreign persons prosecuted under United States laws
receive constitutional protection.4 7
V. CONCLUSION
In the wake of Marino-Garcia and its progeny, a clear trend can be
identified which dramatically alters the prosecution of suspected drug
smugglers on the high seas. The Eleventh Circuit has begun to treat drug
smuggling as a universal crime by expanding the jurisdictional base of
section 955a. It does so by including invalid registration within its defini-
tion of stateless vessel and also by placing the burden of showing a nexus
upon the defense. Instead of focusing on the statelessness of the vessel,
international dialogue would be encouraged by focusing on the vessel's
activities vis-h-vis drug smuggling. This would preserve the constitutional
rights afforded crews of stateless vessels under United States law, while
allowing for effective prosecution of illegal drug traffic on the high seas.
Lynda Hettich Knowles
Directed-Energy Weapons
On The "High Frontier"
I. INTRODUCTION
President Reagan recently announced the proposed development and
deployment by the U.S. of a space-based ABM system utilizing directed-
energy weapons (DEWs).1 Although the proposal provoked a variety of
intense reactions from the political and scientific communities in both the
U.S. and U.S.S.R., it failed to arouse and sustain the public concern
which might otherwise be forthcoming. The "Star Wars" quality of the
plan perhaps renders it superfluous in the minds of most.
Although doubts exist as to whether the technology necessary to im-
plement the President's proposal will ever be available, they do not war-
rant disregard of the impact which would be caused by the development
erty has not suffered any loss of Fourth Amendment rights.
47. See NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 592 (1982).
The Fourth Amendment is applied through the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires
equal protection under the law for all persons. "Aliens are persons, so they receive the pro-
tection of ... the Equal Protection Clause." See also United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d
1252, 1262 (5th Cir. 1979).
1. Reagan Proposes New Weapons, Denver Post, Mar. 24, 1983, at 1-A, col. 2.
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of such a system. This is particularly true in light of the increasing milita-
rization of space and the desire of both the U.S. and Soviet Union to
achieve and maintain military stability.
The Outer Space Treaty2 and the ABM Treaty,' both designed to
address these concerns, may be inadequate when applied to the emerging
beam technology, in view of the probable U.S. and Soviet constructions of
the relevant provisions of these treaties. Consequently, this article will
focus on this problem of treaty interpretation, as well as on the nature of
DEWs and the strategic value of their incorporation into an ABM system.
Included also is a brief discussion of certain policy concerns associated
with the development and deployment of these newest among the so-
called "ultimate weapons."
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEWs
Throughout the 1970s, the Soviets experimented intensively with
anti-satellite weaponry (ASATs),4 and although the Pentagon claims to
be at least fifteen years behind the Soviets in ASAT technology, the U.S.
is scheduled to test its first ASAT later this year.' The development of
directed-energy weapons such as the high-energy laser (HEL) and the
particle beam weapon (PBW) have become more of a priority to both the
U.S. and Soviet Union in recent years.' By 1978, the Soviets were sus-
pected of having developed and successfully tested a PBW and of having
developed the world's largest HEL.' Yet, the Pentagon has only recently
2. Outer Space Treaty, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S.
205. This treaty reveals the early expectations of the signatories that space would eventually
be used for military purposes and that general guidelines are necessary to restrain that ac-
tivity to some degree.
3. ABM Treaty, May 26, 1972, United States-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No.
7503. As an integral part of the SALT I accords, this bilateral treaty prohibits anti-ballistic
missile systems in an attempt to restrict the strategic offensive arms race. It is also the
formal embodiment of the MAD (mutually assured destruction) doctrine, which proposes
that if each state is exposed to the offensive nuclear weapons of the other, neither state will
have the incentive to launch a first-strike attack.
4. See also STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 97TH
CONG., 2ND SESS., SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS 1976-80, at 184-91 (Comm. Print 1982) [hereinaf-
ter cited as SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS].
5. U.S. Military Arsenal Extending Into Space, Rocky Mt. News, Aug. 22, 1983, at 32,
col. 1.
6. The most promising HEL derives its power from chemical reactions and is capable of
producing a 200-billion-watt beam of energy for 20 billionths of a second at the speed of
light. This creates a thermal reaction within the target causing it to melt, vaporize or possi-
bly shatter as a result of internal shock waves, depending on the wavelength used, and the
chemical composition and speed of the target. The PBW is a device "using directed beams
of charged or neutral particles at high energies as projectiles to inflict damage." Such beams
are essentially man-made lightning. For an excellent comprehensive analysis of the opera-
tional aspects of these particular DEWs and an in-depth study of the applicable interna-
tional law, see E. FESSLER, DIRECTED-ENERGY WEAPONS: A JURIDICAL ANALYSIS 8-29 (1979).
7. Cady, Beam Weapons in Space, AIR U. REV., May-June 1982, at 33, 38. See also
Vlasic, Disarmament Decade, Outer Space, and International Law, 26 McGu.L L.J. 135,
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confirmed that it has successfully test-fired its own two-million-volt PBW
as part of the top secret "White Horse" program.' Testing of HELs by
the Department of Defense, however, has been in progress since 1973.9
The Pentagon expects to begin testing the first generation of HELs with
ASAT and ABM capability by 1987." It has been recently disclosed that
U.S. high-energy microwave weaponry is in an even further stage of de-
velopment than both the HEL and PBW."
Considering the relatively early stages of development of these
DEWs, it is odd that the President made public the plan of their eventual
deployment as the principle components of future ABM systems. In fact,
the majority of the scientific community in the U.S. and Soviet Union,
while acknowledging the viability of these weapons in component form,
declares that the technology necessary to incorporate them into an effec-
tive ABM system is unachievable, as well as extremely destablizing.' 2
Others, however, including renowned physicist and current member of
the White House Science Council, Edward Teller, believe that the current
status of DEWs is comparable to the "same stage of development as was
the Manhattan Project in 1940.'1 Teller further implies that with public
support and massive research and development expenditures, ABM sys-
tems utilizing DEWs could be deployed before the turn of the century,
perhaps even within the next decade.14
III. PROJECT HIGH FRONTIER
Directed-energy weapons technology is currently being developed for
integration into an ABM system, most notably the High Frontier propo-
sal. High Frontier, a think tank funded by the conservative Heritage
Foundation, is headed by retired Lieutenant General Daniel Graham, a
former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and more recently
Ronald Reagan's military advisor during the 1976 and 1980 presidential
campaigns. The administration's support of the High Frontier plan
clearly requires renunciation of the MAD (mutually assured destruction)
164-65 (1981).
8. Death Ray is Successfully Test Fired, Rocky Mt. News, Apr. 7, 1983, at 4, col. 2.
9. Laser Technology-Development and Application: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on .oe To hnnogyv nnd Sp re of the Senate Comm. on Commerce. Science, and
Transportation, 96th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess. 85-86 (1979-80) .(statement of Dr. J. Richard
Airey, Director, Directed-Energy Technology, Dept. of Defense) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings].
10. Attack on Spy Satellites Could "Blind" U.S., Rocky Mt. News, Aug. 25, 1983, at
30, col. 1.
11. Microwave Beam May Some Day Join Nation's Weaponry, Rocky Mt. News, Aug.
13, 1983, at 57, col. 1.
12. Rocky Mt. News, note 8 supra. See also Soviet Scientists Slam U.S., Rocky Mt.
News, Apr. 10, 1983, at 50, col. 3.
13. Beane, High Energy Lasers: Strategic Policy Implications, 5 STRATEGIC REV. 100-03
(1977). See also Reagan For the Defense, TiME, Apr. 4, 1983, at 12.
14. See TME, note 13 supra.
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doctrine, and is hoped to "fast thaw the nuclear freeze movement."' 8
In a speech delivered in 1982,16 Graham outlined the High Frontier
concept in some detail, referring to it as a "layered strategic defense" in-
corporating space and land-based beam weapons capable of filtering out
most incoming Soviet missiles, as well as protecting other space assets.'7
Seven years and $35 billion from now, High Frontier's "purely defensive"
system could be fully operational.'9 Admittedly, the plan and its "purely
defensive" application has some appeal in light of the nuclear alternative.
There are some problems, however, which arise upon application of cer-
tain international treaties to the proposal.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE OUTER SPACE AND ABM TREATIES TO PROJECT
HIGH FRONTIER
Despite proponents' apparent disregard for international legal re-
straints, 9 both the Outer Space Treaty and the ABM Treaty are immedi-
ately relevant to any discussion of the implementation of the High Fron-
tier proposal. However, intentional ambiguities in the drafting of these
two treaties and an inclination to construe their relevant provisions very
narrowly makes them nearly inadequate to address the plan.
A. The Outer Space Treaty
The Outer Space Treaty is flawed by the inclusion of two ambiguous
phrases: "peaceful purposes" and "weapons of mass destruction." Be-
cause of the vagueness of these terms, the treaty's applicability in al-
lowing or prohibiting space-based DEWs is uncertain. The main problem
concerns the construction of article IV."° Applying the maxim inclusio
15. Fossedal, Exploring the High Frontier, CONSERVATIVE DIGEST, June 1982, at 3-4.
16. Defense and Development on the High Frontier, a speech by Lt. Gen. Daniel Gra-
ham as part of a seminar entitled Preventing World War III, delivered Feb. 3, 1982 at
Hillsdale College's Center for Constructive Alternatives, Hillsdale, Michigan, reprinted in
IMPRIMIS, June 1982, at 1 [hereinafter cited as Graham].
17. Id. at 2.
18. Id. at 4-5. The High Frontier program also involves the utilization of non-nuclear
space-based missiles, the development of a "high performance space plane," upgrading of
the current Space Shuttle Program, development of a manned low-earth orbit space station
and a space power station, and a stepped-up civil defense program. In addition, the plan
envisions a space industrial systems research and development program to be funded mostly
through private enterprise.
19. Consider the statement of Major Steven Cady, an enthusiastic supporter of beam-
weaponry deployment in space: "Throughout history, great nations wishing to remain great
have interpreted principles of law in a manner consistent with their own needs and inter-
ests. A preoccupation with the niceities [sic] of law. . . has always been the road to disas-
ter. Cady, supra note 7, at 36. (Emphasis added).
20. The Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, at art. IV, states:
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the
earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of
mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such
weapons in outer space in any other manner.
1983
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unius est exclusio alterius to this article, it appears that outer space itself
is not restricted to exclusively "peaceful purposes," whereas the "moon
and other celestial bodies" are restricted.2' The early Soviet position
maintained that "peaceful purposes" meant "non-military, '22 but both
the Soviets and the U.S. currently view the term as meaning "non-
aggressive. '
'1 s
In addition, the treaty's proscription against specific military activi-
ties can easily be interpreted as allowing all other military activities. 4
This means that unspecified military activity will be permitted on the
moon and other celestial bodies as long as it is non-aggressive. This inter-
pretation would also imply that aggressive activity is permissible in outer
space, since article IV's first paragraph does not contain the "peaceful
purposes/non-aggressive" limitations.
High Frontier seems to dismiss the "peaceful purposes" issue alto-
gether. If the U.S. currently equates this phrase with "non-aggressive",
then former Lieutenant General Graham's revealing comment that "[we]
should harbor no illusions that space can be limited to 'peaceful uses'
" . . 9925 may be an indication that those orchestrating the plan have little
intention of maintaining a "non-aggressive" posture, let alone a "non-mil-
itary" one.
Another controversial element of article IV is the phrase "weapons of
mass destruction," which is generally construed to prohibit the orbiting,
installation, or stationing in space of weapons capable of "inflicting dam-
age to extensive geographical areas or injury to substantial populations,
such as nuclear, chemical, or bacteriological weapons. 2' This interpreta-
tion is thought to permit extremely selective, albeit destructive weapons,
including conventional weaponry of less destructive power.2 7 Conse-
quently, since DEWs are comparatively clean, discriminating, and con-
trollable weapons capable of being operated so as to avoid the excess of
devastation sought to be prevented, they may well fall outside of the
treaty restrictions.
On the whole, the Outer Space Treaty seems to delegate to the su-
perpowers "a large degree of freedom to turn this common domain into
an area of bilateral arms competition to the detriment of all the others. 28
The moon and other celestial bodies shall be used ... exclusively for
peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases. . . , the testing of any
type of weapons and the conduct of military maneuvers on celestial bodies
shall be forbidden.
21. E. FESSLER, supra note 6, at 51.
22. Id. at 49.
23. Vlasic, supra note 7, at 171.
24. E. IFSSLER, supra note 6, at 51.
25. Graham, supra note 16, at 4.
26. E. FESSLER, supra note 6, at 53. See also Hearings on the Outer Space Treaty
Before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 90th Cong., 1st. Sess. 76 (1967).
27. For a more detailed discussion, see E. FESSLER, supra note 6, at 52-56.
28. Vlasic, supra note 7, at 174.
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B. The ABM Treaty
The Reagan administration claims that the planned research and de-
velopment of this proposed "high tech" ABM system will not violate pro-
visions of the ABM Treaty, and that only at the deployment stage would
there be any actual conflict with its provisions.2 9 This assertion is proba-
bly incorrect since the purpose of the treaty is to forego the development
of such systems, limiting each party's exposure to the existing offensive
weaponry of the other. By this process, "the pressures of technological
change and its destablizing effects on the strategic balance" will be
minimized. 0
Several problems arise in the application of this treaty to the High
Frontier proposal of using DEWs in an ABM mode. For example, article
II describes specific components of an ABM system.31 The problem is
whether this description is an exclusive or exemplary listing of the com-
ponents intended to be prohibited. If intended as examples, then DEWs
within an ABM system are likely to be proscribed. If article II is in-
tended to be an exclusive enumeration of prohibited components, then
DEWs, not having these components, would fall outside the provision's
prohibition.2
Agreement (D) of the treaty provides that "in the event ABM sys-
tems based on other physical priciples. . . are created in the future, spe-
cific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject
to discussion in accordance with Article XIII of the Treaty."3  This would
imply that future developments in ABM technology, including DEWs,
were not intended to be included in the components listed in article II.
Despite this interpretation, DEWs as components within an ABM
system would be prohibited from being developed, tested, and deployed
pursuant to article V, but only where they were "sea-based, air-based,
space-based, or mobile land-based. ' 34 These components could therefore
be developed and tested if fixed and land-based, assuming that DEWs are
not construed as being included under article II.
Ironically, DEWs could be developed, tested, and deployed in space
within an ASAT mode as long as they were not actually used to interfere
with verification satellites protected by article XII."
Both the Outer Space and the ABM treaties are, in reality, binding
only to the extent that the signatories wish to be bound; thus, circumven-
tion of their purpose and specific provisions can easily be accomplished
by self-serving interpretations. However, in light of the potentially grave
29. Denver Post, note 1 supra.
30. Vlasic, supra note 7, at 176.
31. ABM Treaty, supra note 3, at art. II, para. 1.
32. E. FESSLER, supra note 6, at 69.
33. ABM Treaty, supra note 3, at Agreed Interpretations, para. D.
34. Id. at art. V, para. 1.
35. Id. at art. XII, para 2. See also Hearings, supra note 10, at 88.
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consequences of proceeding with the High Frontier proposal without
clearly-defined restraints, it would be in the best interests of both super-
powers to come to some agreement on procedure before a destabilizing
imbalance occurs.
V. OTHER POLICY PROBLEMS PRESENTED BY THE HIGH FRONTIER
PROPOSAL
In addition to doubts about the viability and effectiveness of the
High Frontier plan, the issue of destabilization has caused prominent
members of the scientific community to condemn the President's propo-
sal.30 The essence of their opposition is that the extension of the arms
race into space merely increases the possibilities of war on earth.8 s Any
shift in the balance of power caused by either nation's sole possession of
these "ultimate weapons" would be likely to set in motion a dangerous
escalation of DEW development by both nations, as well as the escalation
of other weapons designed to penetrate the other's system. For example,
if the U.S. suspected the Soviets of having attained first-strike capability
without fear of a retaliatory strike, it might then be induced to launch a
first-strike against the Soviets before the Soviet ABM system is fully
developed.
While the President has proposed the use of DEWs in a purely de-
fensive manner, former Lieutenant General Graham has proposed other
possible uses, including the preservation of the West's access to raw
materials8" and the assurance of U.S. preeminence in space for military
and commercial exploitation."9 His philosophy is to "move the contest
into a new arena where we could exploit the technological advantages we
hold."4 O
Other strategists envision even first generation DEWs as "politically
useful instruments for achieving critical objectives of American foreign
policy... ,"41 and as permitting the "fighting [of] non-nuclear wars with
the Soviet Union involving vital U.S. national interests .... ,,4' This
kind of diplomatic blackmail is not new. Threats of using atomic and hy-
drogen bombs to coerce other nations to comply with U.S. demands has
apparently been practiced by every President (with the exception of Ger-
ald Ford) since Harry S. Truman.48
36. Soviet Scientists Slam U.S., note 12 supra.
37. Space Weapons Invite Earth War, Rocky Mt. News, May 13, 1983, at 29, col. 1.
Featured in this article are the comments of Astronomer Carl Sagan and Columbia Univer-
sity Professor of Physics Richard Garwin, who spoke in Washington, D.C. in favor of a reso-
lution to ban space weapons.
38. Graham, supra note 16, at 2.
39. Id. at 4.
40. Id. at 2.
41. Smernoff, Strategic Value of Space-Based Laser Weapons, Am U. REv., Mar.-Apr.
1982, at 12.
42. Id. at 11.
43. Ellsberg, Introduction to E. THOMPSON & D. SMITH, PROTEST AND SURVrVE at v-vi
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Because DEWs can be used offensively within an ABM system for
detonating nuclear warheads and other purposes, it is naive to assume
that they will only be restricted to defensive measures, especially since
they may not be singularly effective and may be extremely vulnerable as
well. The main criticism of the High Frontier plan is that in order for
such a system to provide more than just the illusion of security, it would
have to be 100% effective." Leakage of 5-10% is not a problem, however,
according to former Lieutenant General Graham, who asserts that
"[d]efenses throughout military history have been designed to make at-
tack more difficult and more costly-not impossible." '45
VI. CONCLUSION
The containment of space militarization and the alleviation of the
continuous threat of nuclear war are two worthy and compatible goals.
However, if judged to be in the interests of "national security," the devel-
opment and deployment of a space-based ABM system for the stated
purpose of defense will most likely be pursued by the U.S. and the Soviet
Union, despite possible treaty restrictions and the undesirable effect of
destabilization. Such a course will not be the panacea that President Rea-
gan and his advisors envision, however. Technology breeds technology,
and it is almost ludicrous to believe that either superpower will ever be
able to develop the ultimate, impenetrable defensive system. In fact, in-
herent in the development and testing of such a system is the simultane-
ous development and testing of technology designed to counteract or limit
its effectiveness. On the other hand, once a certain level of technology has
been achieved, it can then only be channeled, not suppressed or ignored.
The threat of the military application of such technology will exist as long
as the materials, knowledge, and technology exist. An attempt to stifle the
military exploitation of directed-energy technology by application of am-
biguously worded treaties destined to be ignored, or worse, abused, is a
futile effort. New treaties could be formulated, however, with unambigu-
ous provisions specifically addressing the issue of space-based DEWs and
providing effective sanctions in case of violations. This would allow re-
search in this area to proceed within well-defined guidelines to the mu-
tual advantage of all parties.46
With or without new or renegotiated treaties, the suggestion has been
made that research and development of DEWs should continue as a joint
effort so as to strengthen the validity of U.S. and Soviet claims of "purely
(1981). See generally id. at i-xxviii.
44. Rocky Mt. News, note 37 supra.
45. Graham, supra note 16, at 3.
46. The Soviets have apparently submitted a draft of a proposed treaty to the UN call-
ing for participant states "not to test or deploy . . . any space-based weapons intended to
hit targets on Earth, in the atmosphere, or in outer space" in addition to other provisions
addressing the militarization of space. Soviets Want UN to Ban Manned Military Space-
craft, Rocky Mt. News, Aug. 22, 1983, at 32, col. 3.
1983
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
defensive" intentions.47 Although a well-reasoned approach, this is a high-
ly unlikely alternative, in spite of the almost inevitable destabilization
resulting from a unilateral breakthrough. A better and more palatable so-
lution would be the simultaneous reduction of offensive weaponry by both
nations, which would serve to demonstrate further the sincerity of their
intentions. Recent developments demand that we begin now to re-evalu-
ate our dependence on largely ineffective legal restraints and consider the
propriety of these and other proposed methods designed to avoid the
over-militarization of space as well as the catastrophic destabilization
that would be likely to occur with the implementation of High Frontier.
Mark A. Clark
Powell v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons:
The Treatment of Mexican Work Credits by
U.S. Authorities Under the Prisoner
Transfer Treaty with Mexico
In its recent decision in Powell v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons,' the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that the work credits earned
in a Mexican prison by a prisoner subsequently transferred to the United
States represented only a conditional reduction in the offender's sentence.
The court held that U.S. authorities could order such work credits for-
feited when the offender violated the conditions of his parole. Through
the court's interpretation of the terms of the United States-Mexico Pris-
oner Transfer Treaty, 2 the decision clarifies the Treaty's jurisdictional al-
location of sentencing issues to the Transferring State and parole issues
to the Receiving State.
The United States entered into the treaty negotiations with Mexico
in response to public concern over the frequently inhumane treatment
U.S. nationals received in Mexican prisons and out of a desire to lessen
the bilateral tensions which resulted.$ Under the terms of the Treaty,
U.S. nationals serving time in Mexico can be transferred to American cus-
tody for the remainder of their sentences.' Mexican nationals held in U.S.
47. Buckley, Share Defense Research, Rocky Mt. News, Apr. 7, 1983, at 70.
1. 695 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1983).
2. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Nov. 25, 1976, United States-Mexico,
28 U.S.T. 7399, T.I.A.S. No. 8718.
3. Kowalski, Penal Transfer Treaties and the Application of 'Unconstitutional Condi-
tions' Analysis, 12 U. TOL. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1980).
4. In addition to several conditions which must be met before a transfer can be ef-
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